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ABSTRACT
Background: This article examines the multifaceted
structures and complex operations of the World Health
Organization and its regional offices; it also reassesses
the form and the workings of the global smallpox
eradication programme with which these bodies were
closely linked in the 1960s and 1970s.
Methods: Using the case study of South Asia, it seeks to
highlight the importance of writing nuanced histories of
international health campaigns through an assessment of
differences between official rhetoric and practice.
Results and conclusion: The article argues that the
detailed examination of the implementation of policy in a
variety of localities, within and across national borders,
allows us to recognise the importance of the agency of
field managers and workers. This analytical approach also
helps us acknowledge that communities were able to
influence the shape and the timing of completion of public
health campaigns in myriad ways. This, in turn, can
provide useful pointers for the design and management of
health programmes in the contemporary world.
The global eradication of smallpox was certified by
an independent committee of experts in December
1979, and the announcement was ratified by the
World Health Organization (WHO) in 1980.
Widely hailed as one of the biggest medical
triumphs of the twentieth century, the campaign
to eradicate smallpox worldwide is often described
in overly simplistic terms in institutional histories,
published memoirs and, not least, academic works
that unquestioningly accept participants’ retro-
spective retelling of their experiences. The picture
presented, generally, is one of unified actions; the
many different cogs of a complex administrative
wheel, it is frequently claimed, apparently worked
in almost perfect unison, causing orders from the
top of the organisational pyramid to be implemen-
ted in localities across the globe. Such an inter-
pretation would have us believe that the
calculations and actions of a few senior managers
controlled the actions of a huge number of public
health and medical personnel of different educa-
tional backgrounds, nationalities, political affilia-
tions and gender, over the course of more than a
decade. This perspective downplays the ability of
field workers to come up with ideas and implement
them according to the plethora of social, political
and economic conditions encountered in a multi-
plicity of localities.
1–3
The organised drive to expunge smallpox was,
however, a much more complicated and disjointed
entity. A composite of numerous multifaceted
country- and region-oriented public health pro-
grammes, the campaign combined the work of
several non-government agencies with that of
different national, provincial and district adminis-
trations. A careful assessment of unpublished
WHO papers reveals that these collaborative
ventures involved a series of time-consuming
negotiations with numerous bureaucrats, politi-
cians and funding agencies. This, in turn, resulted
in complex administrative and financial arrange-
ments that needed to be re-established at frequent
intervals; a product of the fact that inter- and
intra-governmental discussions and the resulting
aid packages, which were to prove decisive to the
successful completion of smallpox eradication,
were frequently organised on varying bilateral
and multilateral bases. WHO officials were gen-
erally involved in multilateral negotiations, as
initiators of negotiations, witnesses to the comple-
tion of signed agreements and, sometimes, apoli-
tical distributors of resources in the shape of
vaccine, vaccinating kits, money and personnel.
4
Yet, these WHO representatives were often not
in control of the unfolding of policy imperatives,
mainly because a variety of international, regional,
national and local developments continually threa-
tened to blow the most tightly organised plans off
course. Projects often stuttered along uncharted
paths, as their managers were constantly forced to
adapt to unexpected problems. Because of this,
desired results were frequently achieved almost
accidentally, surprising even the most optimistic
and committed field personnel. An appreciation of
all these complexities, which are very often glossed
over, does not detract from the significance of the
smallpox eradication. To the contrary, it highlights
the enormity of the achievement, which many
officials and politicians considered impossible dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s.
45
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLEXITY OF THE WHO
The United Nations came into being soon after the
end of the Second World War, and the WHO was
established as one of its major, specialised sections
in 1948. The WHO headquarters (HQ) was
established in Geneva, Switzerland, and this body
took on the role of trying to help in the
development and coordination of public health
and medical schemes across the globe. In its
formative years, these activities were targeted
particularly at regions that had been badly affected
by the war and countries that had managed to
break loose from colonialism; the advertised goal
was to carry out all this work on an apolitical
basis.
67
The WHO has, from its inception, been a
complex administrative structure. It consists of a
Health Assembly, a Director General’s office that is
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committee and, not least, a large secretariat. The Assembly
was formed by representatives of all the member nations, who
met at regular intervals in Geneva and involved themselves in
proposing schemes and voting for their implementation. This
body was given the power, through the WHO constitution, to
ask the Director General’s office and his/her advisory committee
to develop detailed plans for the implementation of policies and
programmes; all completed plans were presented to the
assembly and then forwarded to the secretariat’s bureaucracy
for implementation. This, in turn, ensured the formulation of
numerous plans within the WHO HQ and the various WHO
regional offices, as workers associated with these bodies, with
different types of training, specialisation and institutional
affiliation, frequently came up with varying ideas about how
best to achieve different goals.
6
To add to the complexity of what was really the first stage of
policy implementation, departments within the different WHO
offices would also often set up—on a collaborative basis or
otherwise—specialist research groups to provide blueprints for
action. These suggestions, which were often published as so-
called technical reports, did not automatically become ordained
as WHO blanket policy; instead, organisational representatives
in the field were often directed by WHO office managers to give
greater attention to some proposals than others, as a variety of
political and economic considerations had to be made part of
the larger calculations of designing and implementing policy. A
further layer of operational complexity was added by the
experiences of field personnel, who had to work in a variety of
regional, national and local contexts. Indeed, as these officials—
of different nationalities, races, gender and educational profile—
adapted to a variety of political, economic, social and medical
situations, they were forced to reinterpret centrally dictated
policies in numerous ways. In doing this, it is striking that
WHO field officials were continually forced, sometimes to their
displeasure, to draw upon local sources of information and help.
This assistance was generally sought from among local political
structures and sections of the social groups at whom different
public health policies were being targeted. This local knowledge
and the resultant activities were, of course, not always in
concert, as varying interests competed for recognition and
precedence, adding several layers of operational complexity to
the unfolding of public health and medical campaigns.
4
It is worth noting here that all the WHO regional offices,
their departments and the country representatives within them
were important actors in the formulation and implementation
of policy in the field. This has been ignored in most academic
studies, which tend to focus on either the voices of a handful of
people based in Geneva or the Health Assembly’s resolutions
published by the WHO HQ after several rounds of careful
editing. This also perhaps explains why the significant voices of
national- and local-level staff, usually employed by different
WHO offices on short-term contracts of varying lengths, is
almost entirely lost in historical writings dealing with different
health programmes.
8 This is a serious lacuna, as the opinions
and actions of such staff, who were usually in touch with local
politicians and bureaucrats, acting as crucial links between them
and a range of international WHO workers on a day-to-day
basis, are a crucial element in projects sponsored, managed or
encouraged by both the WHO HQ and regional offices. Getting
access to these significant voices is difficult, requiring concerted
archive research and a willingness to chase down personal
papers and talk to WHO workers of all grades (sometimes in
languages other than English). However, such difficulties should
not be used by historians as a justification for the preparation of
blinkered studies denying agency to all but a handful of senior
WHO administrators.
SOUTH ASIAN NATIONAL SMALLPOX ERADICATION
PROGRAMMES
The WHO’s World Health Assembly (WHA) started considering
the prospect of eradicating smallpox worldwide in early 1950—
discussions on the topic were held within the WHA that year,
and in 1953, 1954 and 1958. Indeed, Dr Brock Chisholm, the
WHO’s first Director General, proposed global smallpox
eradication in 1953, even if these discussions did not progress
particularly far. Noticeable progress on the issue was witnessed
at the 11th WHA, which was held in Minneapolis, USA, in
1958, where Professor Viktor Zdhanov, the USSR Deputy
Minister of Health, argued that the eradication of the variola
virus was theoretically possible and important to the world as a
whole, including countries that had managed to expunge the
disease within their territories. His views—and the proposal put
forward by him in the shape of what is often referred to as the
‘‘Zdhanov resolution’’—received broad-based support at the
gathering, leading the WHO’s Executive Board to meet
immediately after the WHA and announce preparations for a
future smallpox eradication drive. In Geneva, this took the
shape of the acceptance of donations of freeze-dried smallpox
vaccine from the USSR and glycerolated vaccine from Cuba,
which was used to create an ‘‘account’’ that would distribute
stocks to countries where eradication campaigns were initiated;
the decision also resulted in discussions with officials based in
the WHO regional offices and national governments in charge
of smallpox endemic territories.
2
The relatively small number of WHO officials who started
discussing the prospects of global eradication of smallpox in the
early 1960s very much hoped that it would be a top–down
campaign, wherein the WHO HQ in Geneva—and, particularly,
some departments within it—would be able to set a general
campaign agenda. Recommendations were, for instance, volun-
teered in relation to how immunisation might be carried out,
what sort of vaccines to use and how to assess the achievement
of eradication. However, their experience quickly revealed the
pitfalls of believing that they could automatically assume such
intellectual and technical leadership. Representatives within the
WHO regional offices raised numerous queries about proposals
sent in from Geneva, and highlighted their own firmly held
belief that all central directives would require tailoring to fit
local conditions. These features of ‘‘locality’’ were presented as
being challenging and inconstant, which, in turn, it was argued,
meant that programme implementation would require frequent
re-jigging, as political arrangements with different national
governments were set up, reconfigured or abandoned.
Significantly, similar trends remained visible after 1967, when
the WHO’s Health Assembly formally signed up, with great
fanfare, to the goal of global smallpox eradication.
4
There were disagreements, too, at other administrative levels
about how a global campaign to eradicate variola might be
organised and run. Plans that were presented as a good idea by
one group of WHO workers at one regional office were almost
routinely challenged within their organisation and outside.
Criticism from within other regional offices was often quite
strident, as officials based therein made it a point to underline
the need to develop locally specific plans. And as the scope of
what was defined as constituting the ‘‘locality’’ expanded from
government structures located within specific national capitals
to the political and social constituencies of the districts,
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immunisation policies were actually going to unfold, the
disagreements within the complexity of WHO structures
became even more marked.
9
The South Asian subcontinent, which was the focus of the
global eradication programme in the late 1960s and the 1970s
owing to the high incidence of variola in the region, was a good
case in point. WHO officials in touch with representatives of
the Indian, Pakistani, Nepali, Sri Lankan, Bhutanese, Burmese
and, later, Bangladeshi national governments—and, therefore,
keenly aware of the many expectations and tensions within
those multifaceted formations—refused to blindly accept orders
relating to the blanket implementation of specific immunisation
strategies and vaccine usage patterns coming in from Geneva.
Strikingly, suggestions from the HQ were frequently queried
and discussions were held within the regional offices about how
the dictates from Geneva might be restructured to best meet a
host of local needs. These trends were very noticeable within
the Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office (EMRO), which
dealt with Pakistan, and the South East Asian Regional Office
(SEARO), which was charged with the task of working with the
other subcontinental governments (including Bangladesh after
1971). An assessment of all such discussions, which is best done
through a study of unpublished telegrams, letters and reports
available in the various WHO archives, reveals that officials
located within different levels and departments of the regional
offices continued to hold disparate views right until global
smallpox eradication was formally certified.
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As is to be expected, the prevalence of numerous ideas about
how work ought to be carried out within SEARO and EMRO
influenced the many ways in which eradication policies were
implemented. Like the WHO HQ in Geneva, the regional offices
were not monolithic bodies. Some officials were more enthu-
siastic than others about the goal of variola eradication, and
divergences in policy implementation were further encouraged
by the fact that Regional Directors remained keen to advertise
their autonomy by seeking to reconfigure guidelines received
from the HQ, usually on the basis of their own understanding
of local requirements. Such variation in bureaucratic support
within the WHO was frequently identified in internal,
unpublished documents as a significant impediment to the
smooth running of the overall programme. This helps explain
why SEARO structures were reorganised in the 1970s, clearly in
an effort to ensure smoother and direct interactions between
the Smallpox Eradication Unit headed by Donald Henderson in
Geneva and the field officers in the region. Notably, this took
the form of setting up a unit in New Delhi, within the SEARO
establishment, which was put in Nicole Grasset’s charge; this
body was made directly answerable to Henderson and his team
and also given access to special funds donated by a variety of
funding agencies (the Swedish International Development
Agency was a major contributor towards the costs of the so-
called intensified phase of activity in India and Bangladesh in
the 1970s). The aim, it appears, was to counteract the then
SEARO Regional Director’s opposition to the way the smallpox
programme was being run in South Asia, and develop a
relatively independent taskforce drawn from a variety of
WHO-affiliated workers, both international and South Asian.
4
This reorganisation of personnel helped in other ways as well.
For example, it allowed for the inflow of a miscellany of ideas
from the field about how best to adapt to a variety of local
conditions (this information was often forthcoming from South
Asian field officials of different ranks, who were involved in
great numbers on contracts of varying lengths). Placed in the
hands of Geneva- and New Delhi-based managers who were
willing to avoid the strict top-down imposition of centrally
dictated policies, to negotiate with the target population and,
not least, to adapt work to assuage local concerns and innovate
in relation to the running of the so-called search and contain-
ment strategies that were central to the campaigns of the 1970s,
such input was invaluable. Indeed, it allowed teams of
international and local workers, who were generally mobilised
in groups containing personnel of different nationalities (the
Indian government insisted on such an arrangement before
allowing foreign epidemiologists to work in the country), to
respond quickly to a diversity of local crises and social, political
and economic needs.
10 That the personnel were spared the need
to get endless bureaucratic clearances for finances controlled by
the Regional Director and national governments helped
enormously, as it saved valuable time and allowed for greater
flexibility.
49
This is not to say that opposition, from within WHO
agencies and complex national political frameworks, disap-
peared completely over time. Indeed, pockets of often intense
hostility remained in a situation where the Regional Directors
retained powerful political alliances within and across national
borders; this was compounded by the significant power held by
critics within South Asian national, provincial and district
governments and their various departments, and the doubts
about the efficacy of vaccination harboured by some sections of
society.
11 Strikingly, not all public health and medical officials
were supportive of smallpox eradication, as many considered
the goal an impossible one and, therefore, a misguided waste of
scarce resources. Administrative bottlenecks frequently resulted,
as plans suggested by the WHO’s smallpox eradication units in
Geneva and New Delhi were questioned and, sometimes,
blocked within different levels of South Asian administration.
These trends threw up vital challenges in a situation where
WHO officials had varying levels of access to different national
territories; problems that, it has to be noted, could be overcome
only through sustained negotiations with politicians and
bureaucrats of all ranks (including members of the political
opposition), and members of the target population. As
mentioned earlier, international workers could not just fly into
the national capitals and then disperse as they wished. In all
cases, they required clearance from a country’s federal authority
for entry and work, with additional paperwork required for
visits to politically sensitive enclaves (India’s North Eastern
Frontier Area, as it was then designated, was a case in point, as
was the highly disturbed Indo-Bangladeshi border in the 1970s).
The result, therefore, was a complex patchwork of distinct
plans and patterns of work in a multiplicity of urban and rural
areas. These coexisted uneasily, and sometimes openly came
into conflict owing to the influence of a variety of adminis-
trative, economic and social factors; situations that required
careful resolution through sensitive diplomatic negotiations
carried out by WHO workers in association with their allies in
national and local government. Force was sometimes used to
counter opposition to vaccinations associated with search and
containment regimes, but these were exceptions rather than the
norm. Once again, these initiatives could not be carried out by
WHO personnel in isolation, as the danger of a violent social
and political backlash was acute—unpublished WHO and
government correspondence regarding campaigns of forcible
immunisation suggests careful planning and synchronisation of
efforts between organisational employees, South Asian politi-
cians of all ranks and hues and, not least, national and local
military, paramilitary and police forces (links that were almost
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tion had been achieved). It was a combination of all these
initiatives that allowed for the eradication of smallpox in South




The global eradication of smallpox is, by any measure, an
enormous achievement. To recognise that this goal was reached
in the face of tremendous difficulties, often emanating from
within the organisations involved in the planning and imple-
mentation of policies, does not detract from that accomplish-
ment. However, it does serve as a reminder that scholars should
avoid being swept away by the heroic narratives that tend to
predominate in official histories prepared after the certification
of eradication. Historians and other chroniclers need to be
equally careful about being over-reliant on reports published
during the programme’s earlier stages, as these tend to offer
only the views of a few people, who hoped, usually in vain, that
their recommendations would be implemented as policy in the
field. Ground realities, as this article attempts to show, were
always significantly more intricate. And this complexity can
only really be revealed by a careful analysis of unpublished
papers dealing with the day-to-day discussions about policy,
which are useful precisely because they reveal the views and
actions of the thousands of field managers and personnel who
contributed to smallpox eradication; their ability to study and
adapt to a plethora of local conditions was crucial to the
ultimate result and, therefore, merits recognition.
Assessing the intellectual, political and social agendas of a
handful of senior WHO officials is fine as long as we do not end
up assuming that everyone else associated with it was devoid of
both intellect and the ability to make a difference in the design
and implementation of policy. The views of WHO Directors
General, their advisors and overall heads of disease control
programmes are undoubtedly important. Yet, it is important to
remember that their views were neither static nor able to
dictate the day-to-day running of a highly complex organisa-
tion. At the same time, it would be foolhardy for the historian
seeking to study the complex interplay between global, regional,
national and local forces to ignore the complicated political
networks that different constituents of the WHO had to
contend with on a daily basis, often through the offices of staff
employed locally on a variety of short-term contracts.
13
The attempt here is to emphasise the difference between
theory and practice; the need to distinguish between the official
rhetoric from the WHO HQ and regional offices and the nature
of work actually carried out in a variety of field situations is of
paramount importance. This would allow the preparation of
more rounded histories of health campaigns run on a global
scale, which were—and continue to be—reliant on the
assistance provided by numerous local political and social
actors. And unlike some relatively thinly researched and
jargon-filled analyses of the thoughts and actions of a few
senior organisational personnel,
38a thorough assessment of the
intricacies of global health organisations and their links to
national and local governments can actually provide useful
insights into the management of current health programmes.
Apart from anything else, the careful examination of policy
implementation would suggest that the acute differences
between vertical and horizontal health programmes, which
analysts dependent on published policy assertions regularly
allude to,
14 15 are far less marked than assumed. Indeed, local
infrastructural exigencies and field experiences often forced
developments that blurred the lines between preventive and
curative medicine; an important point to remember when the
WHO HQ’s renewed emphasis on the worldwide regeneration
of the structures of primary healthcare is stoking interesting
discussions, within and outside the organisation, about its
ability to bring about meaningful changes in developing, less
developed and developed countries.
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What this study adds
A new historical perspective on the World Health Organization
and its multifaceted involvement in the global smallpox
eradication programme, which is one of the greatest medical
achievements of the twentieth century.
Policy implications
This article suggests the adoption of historical methodology that
can, the author feels, help prepare nuanced studies that can
provide insights into ways of developing flexible and multifaceted
international and global health campaigns.
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